USA v. King by unknown
2006 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-31-2006 
USA v. King 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. King" (2006). 2006 Decisions. 1029. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1029 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 05-2081
                    




                    
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 04-cr-00177)
District Judge:  Hon. Cynthia M. Rufe
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 19, 2006
BEFORE:  McKEE and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,
and McCLURE,* District Judge 
(Opinion Filed:  May 31, 2006)
                    
                                   
* Hon. James F. McClure, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
                  
2                   
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Steven King was convicted after trial of attempting to manufacture
methamphetamine and of maintaining a place to manufacture methamphetamine.  He was
sentenced to 120 months of incarceration and 8 years of supervised release.  He here
complains of the District Court’s (1) denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence
seized during the execution of a search warrant; (2) denial of a motion to suppress a
statement which he made to police officers; and (3) enhancement of his sentence based on
a prior conviction not proven at trial.
I.
Contrary to King’s contention, the affidavit submitted in support of an application
to search the garage he rented provided ample support for the magistrate’s determination
of probable cause.
While the appendix submitted by the parties does not include the affidavit that was
the focus of much of the briefing, it does reflect, however, that King asked the District
Court to make the following findings with respect to the affidavit:
7.  Analyzed for its content the first paragraph of the affidavit advised the
Bail Commissioner that:
(1)  None of the information contained therein was personally
known to the affiant.  All information set forth and sworn to
simply reflected what Officer Monaghan was told by Sgt.
3Boudwin.
(2)  Sgt. Boudwin had received information from a reliable
confidential informant of his (#1) that Defendant King
operated a meth lab inside the rear garage of 6627 Greenway
Avenue distinguished by a grey steel security door on the
outside; that King had males inside the garage cooking the
product using a live lab; and King stored U.S.C. inside the
house at Greenway Avenue representing proceeds from drug
sales.
(3)  The “reliability” of C/I#1 was based simply on “previous
arrests and convictions of individuals within the confines of
Delaware County”.  No other information attesting to C/I#1's
reliability was set forth.
(4)  The affiant did not recite how or when C/I#1 had become
privy to the information concerning King operating a meth lab
in the garage, men working in the garage cooking product, or
the storing of money in the house.
(5)  The affiant did not set forth whether the information
garnered from C/I#1 reflected past or present activity within
the garage and house at 6627 Greenway Avenue.  Indeed,
Officer Monaghan testified that he did not know when or how
long ago C/I#1 had allegedly learned the information
imparted to Sgt. Boudwin.
8.  The second paragraph of the affidavit again reflected information not
personally known to the affiant, but as related to him by Sgt. Boudwin. 
This paragraph, analyzed for its content, advised the Bail Commissioner
that:
(1)  Delaware County Detectives had met with C/I#2 between
7/1/03 and 7/2/03.
(2)  C/I#2 had been “considered to be reliable in the past”. 
No information whatsoever was provided documenting the
alleged reliability of C/I#2.
(3)  C/I#2 was briefed by police on attempting to purchase a
quantity of meth from inside the rear garage of 6627
Greenway Avenue.
(4)  After being searched to insure that C/I#2 had no
contraband on his person he was provided “a quantity of
U.S.C.” to use in making a purchase.
(5)  C/I#2 was observed entering upon the driveway of 6627
Greenway Avenue and then going “out of sight of police for
approx [sic] five minutes”.
4(6)  C/I#2 was next observed exiting the driveway.  He was
then followed to a secure location where he turned over a
plastic bag which field tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine.
App. at 82-84 (emphasis in original).
Even accepting these proposed findings, it is apparent to us that the affidavit
provided probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be found in the garage. 
In short, a confidential informant, who had a history of providing reliable information to
the police, told the police that King operated a methamphetamine lab inside the garage. 
This was corroborated the day of the search when a controlled purchase of
methamphetamine was made from the garage.
II.
The District Court declined to suppress statements King made to the police even
though they were made in response to police questions asked after his arrest but before
Miranda warnings were given.  The court found, with record support, “that the primary
object of [the] questions was to obtain safety information from Defendant before law
enforcement personnel entered the potentially dangerous clandestine methamphetamine
laboratory [and the] questions asked Defendant were consistent with this goal.”  App. at
16.  The court concluded that King’s statements were accordingly not subject to
suppression, citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).  We agree.
5III.
It is true, as King stresses, that the District Court, in the course of imposing a 10
year mandatory minimum sentence, found that King had a prior conviction for a felony
drug offense.  He claims that this was reversible error under Shepard v. United States, 544
U.S. 13 (2005).  It was not.  The Shepard Court specifically pointed out that its decision
did not affect Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which continues
to authorize a sentencing judge, in the context of an enhancement, to resolve the simple,
“conclusive” fact of a prior conviction.  Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25.  See United States v.
Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that Almendarez-Torres remains
good law unless and until the Supreme Court chooses to overturn it).  
IV.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
